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BANKRUPTCY-PRE-PLAN
AUTHORIZATIONS-NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PROHIBITS
FIRST DAY ORDERS AND PREPLAN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PREPETITION DEBT
Ryan K. Carney
ANKRUPTCIES today are growing more complex, but are also
increasingly more accepted as an option for business survival and
competition. As bankruptcy judges have attempted to deal with
the realistic problems presented by complex debtors having dozens, if not
hundreds, of creditors while attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11
and emerge as healthier business entities, the use of "first day orders" or
"pre-plan payments" have allowed them to make practical decisions and
keep companies functional.1 However, in CapitalFactors, Inc. v. Kmart
Corp.,2 Judge Grady for the Northern District of Illinois calls this practice
into question by ruling that pre-plan payments are prohibited by the
Bankruptcy Code.3 Unfortunately for companies faced with reorganization, if higher courts agree with Judge Grady, this highly practical solution may soon see the end of its day in court. 4 This note will show,
however, that Judge Grady's conclusion is fatally flawed because his analysis does not adequately analyze the Supreme Court's "doctrine of necessity ' 5 and its effect in conjunction with the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code.
Kmart Corp. ("Kmart"), a nationwide supermarket chain, "filed a voluntary petition for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the . . .
Bankruptcy Code" on January 22, 2002.6 As is common practice, they
immediately filed a motion to authorize payment of "prepetition obliga1. See generally Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. 818, 820-21 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (acknowledging the utility of pre-plan authorizations).
2. Id.

3. Id. at 822-23.
4. See id. at 823 (Judge Grady found that pre-plan authorizations were not authorized
in the code and that they were therefore beyond the equitable powers of bankruptcy
judges).
5. See Miltenberger v. Logansport C. & S.W.R. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882) (approving

of certain payments of pre-petition debt to secure critical supplies or services).
6. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 820.
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tions to certain 'critical vendors." 7 These vendors were deemed critical
for a variety of reasons and included foreign vendors and alcohol suppliers. 8 It is not entirely clear from the facts that all the so-called "critical
vendors" were actually "critical." 9 Capital Factors, Inc. ("Capital"), an
unsecured creditor of Kmart, objected to such payments because they believed that payment of the "critical vendors" would reduce the likelihood
that they would recover the more than twenty million dollars they were
owed by Kmart. 10 However, "Kmart contended that these payments
were necessary to maintain relationships essential to its continued operation and reorganization.""
After hearing evidence on the motions filed regarding the pre-plan
payments, the bankruptcy judge ordered the payments over Capital's objections.' 2 The bankruptcy judge decided that payment of "critical vendors" was in the best interest of all creditors if it facilitated the process of
Chapter 11, but he admitted that bankruptcy judges are "seeing more and
more [first day orders for pre-plan authorizations] and ...have to stretch
to find some authority to do them."'1 3 Capital appealed that ruling to the
Northern District of Illinois claiming, inter alia, that pre-plan authorizations are not permissible and that if they are, they were not proper in this
14
case.
Although the precedential value of Kmart Corp., is limited,' 5 it represents a crucial decision being made in bankruptcy courts today.1 6 The
court was faced with a run-of-the-mill bankruptcy in which the debtor in
possession filed a routine request to pay pre-petition debts to "critical
vendors" in order to maintain a functional relationship and pursue the
goals of Chapter 11.17 The court then had to decide, as will future courts,
whether the highly practical use of pre-plan authorizations under the
"doctrine of necessity" is admissible under the Bankruptcy Code as it
stands. 18
The Northern District of Illinois United States District Court holds that
pre-plan authorizations, "however useful and practical [they] may appear
to bankruptcy courts, they simply are not authorized by the Bankruptcy
Code" and are therefore not admissible. 19 Many courts have used 11
U.S.C. § 105(a), which states that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting App. to Appellee's Brief Ex. 4A, at 162).
14. See id. at 821 (discussing issues raised on appeal).
15. The only courts required to follow the Northern District of Illinois District Court
holdings are the bankruptcy courts in the Northern District of Illinois.
16. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 820.
17. Id. at 820-21.
18. See generally id. at 822.
19. Id. at 823.
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sions of this title,"'20 as a basis for their equitable powers to grant pre-plan
nlthorizations.2 1 Judee Gradv, however, holds that based on the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) "allows [bankruptcy]
courts to use their equitable powers only as necessary to enforce the provisions of the Code," the power to grant pre-plan authorizations does not
22
exist where there is no authorization found in the Bankruptcy Code.
Judge Grady does admit, however, that "[t]here is a split in the courts
regarding whether § 105 authorizes bankruptcy courts to permit pre-plan
'23
payment of pre-petition unsecured claims."
Both Kmart and Capital are able to cite several courts that would support their arguments, but Judge Grady points out that Capital cites higher
authority relative to those cases cited by Kmart. 24 Capital is able to claim
that three courts of appeals have ruled on similar issues to constrain the
equitable powers granted by § 105.25 However, Kmart can rely on a long
history of bankruptcy courts using the equitable powers under § 105 in
conjunction with the common law "doctrine of necessity" as recognized
by the Supreme Court to help entities under Chapter 11 successfully
maintain business relationships that are crucial to their future
26
profitability.
Although Judge Grady bases his opinion on authority that limits the
equitable powers granted in 11 U.S.C. § 105 to bankruptcy judges in
other related matters, 27 his use of that persuasive authority 28 is not convincing for several reasons. First, he summarily includes the common law
"doctrine of necessity" in with § 105, subjecting it to the restrictions set
forth against § 105's equitable powers that were not related to the "doctrine of necessity" and "critical vendors. '29 Second, the cases he cites in
order to support his conclusion are generally not on point. 30 Last and
most importantly, when he determines that the Bankruptcy Code does
not authorize pre-plan payments, he does not explore the fact that the
overriding purpose of Chapter 11 may implicitly justify the equitable so-

20. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2003).
21.

See Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 822; In re Just For Feet, Inc., 292 B.R. 821, 824 (D.

Del. 1999).
22. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 822 (quoting In re Fresco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152,
156 (7th Cir. 1993)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. (citing Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th
Cir. 1987); B&W Enters, Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1983); Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne & Assoc. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d
1329 (5th Cir. 1993); In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405 (E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Timberhouse Post
& Bean, Ltd., 196 B.R. 547 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1996)).
26. Id. at 822.
27. Id. at 822 (listing cases for discussion of authority).
28. See id. at 822 (see cases cited supra note 25).
29. Id. at 823.
30. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 37-48.
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lution when considered in conjunction with § 105. 3 1
The "doctrine of necessity" was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the restructuring of railroads 32 "as justification for the payment
of pre-petition debts paid under duress to secure continued supplies or
services essential to the continued operation of the railroad. '3 3 The doctrine was based on the premise that the public was well-served by continued service of the railroads. 34 This doctrine has since been applied to
businesses in other industries after Judge Learned Hand "held that a
court was not 'helpless' to apply the rule to non-railroad debtors. ' 35 It is
common sense that if a business is worth more as a going entity than
selling its assets, then the public good is better served by allowing the
organization to make the necessary payments to secure the needed supplies and credit for future operations and profitability. Judge Grady here,
however, has determined that because this "doctrine is not codified...
the only way to apply it is through § 105."36 Combining the "doctrine of
necessity" in as part of § 105, allows him to minimize it as a factor when
he applies cases that restrict equitable powers under § 105.
Although Judge Grady comments that the case law seems stronger in
favor of prohibiting pre-plan payments, 37 the cases that he has referenced
in support of Capital are not controlling authority and for the most part
are not on point.38 For example, the court in Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey,39 does restrict a judge's range of equitable
actions, but does not refer to the "doctrine of necessity," nor does it ever
address pre-plan authorizations for "critical vendors. '40 In Mabey, former users of the Dalkon Shield, a medical device used for birth control,
were suing the manufacturer for infertility caused by its use. 41 The equitable action prevented by the court was the creation of an emergency
treatment fund authorizing the debtor to pay for many of the plaintiffs'
surgical procedures before the bankruptcy plan was finished. 42 This action, however generous to the victims, did not affect the debtor's ability
to reorganize and continue business operations; therefore, the "doctrine
of necessity" was not applicable nor was it discussed. 43 The same criti31. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (stating "[tjhe fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with
an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.").
32. See Miltenberger v. Logansport C. & S.W.R. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882).
33. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 822 (citing B&W Enters., Inc v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re
B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983)).
34. See generally Miltenberger, 106 U.S. at 286.
35. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Judge
Learned Hand from Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
873 (1945)).
36. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 822.
37. Id.
38. See id.; see cases cited supra note 25.
39. 832 F.2d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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cism applies to In re Oxford Management. Inc.44 This case restricted a
court's ability to order a debtor to pay a broker's commission based on a
tangential legal issue, but the broker was not a "critical vendor" because
the services were not ongoing, and again the court did not apply or discuss the "doctrine of necessity" or "critical vendors. '45 Judge Grady's
use of these cases depends upon analogizing one restriction on a bankruptcy judge's power to another, but the analogy is not valid because in
Kmart Corp., the equitable power used is supported with the "doctrine of
necessity" and the overriding purpose of Chapter 11. The only higher
authority relied upon by Judge Grady that even mentions "critical vendors" is B&W Enterprises v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enterprises,
Inc.), 4 6 and the analysis in that case fails to adequately consider the pur47
pose of Chapter 11 and the Supreme Court's "doctrine of necessity."
Thus, the court's analysis in B&W Enterprises, as merely persuasive authority, is subject to the same criticism as Judge Grady's analysis in Kmart
Corp. The case law that Judge Grady finds strong 48 appears weak when
scrutinized in comparison to the actual issues presented in Kmart Corp.
Perhaps Judge Grady's most incomplete conclusion is that § 105 prohibits pre-plan payments for "critical vendors" because they are not authorized in the Bankruptcy Code. 49 This conclusion is based on Capital's
argument that the pre-plan payments re-prioritize creditors in a way that
is not codified in the Bankruptcy Code because "[t]he Code does not
carve out priority.., for prepetition general unsecured claims based on
the 'critical' or 'integral' status of a creditor. '50 Although pre-plan payment of "critical vendors" may not be explicitly authorized, the entire
concept of Chapter 11 implicitly authorizes such payments because "paying certain pre-petition claims may be necessary to realize the goal of
chapter 11-a successful reorganization." 51 Chapter 11 exists for the purpose of restructuring entities that are worth more as ongoing concerns
than they are if their assets are sold off; a major part of such a determination is based on the assumption that the firm will still be able to conduct
business.52 The question of the priority of creditors must be second to
the survival and reorganization of the entity because the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that "the paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to
which all other bankruptcy policies are subordinated, is the rehabilitation
of the debtor. '53 As such, the issue is not the priority of debtors repaid,
44. 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993).
45. Id. at 1333-34
46. 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983).
47. Id.

48. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 822-23; see cases cited supra note 25.
49. Id. at 823.
50. Id. at 822.
51. In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 825-26 (D. Del. 1999).
52. Id.
53. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting NLRB
v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) which stated "[t]he fundamental purpose of
reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of
jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.").
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but the survival and profitability of the reorganized entity enabling all
creditors to be repaid.
Clearly there are many situations where a debtor entity will not be able
to survive without certain "critical vendors." Historically speaking, one
of the most common "critical vendors" would be the debtor's employees,
because if the employees were not compensated for past work, they
would not continue to work, nor could the debtor hire willing labor in
such a situation. "Critical vendor" status could also be met by a vendor
that could not survive to supply the debtor if not repaid during the reorganization process. Admittedly, in Kmart Corp. there may have been
vendors included in the Critical Vendors Motion which were not actually
"critical" because the case does not provide facts that prove they were;
however, that is not reason to eliminate pre-plan payments for those ven55
dors who are actually "critical." ' 54 For instance, in In re Just For Feet,
the survival of their chain of shoe superstores required a profitable holiday shopping season, which in turn would require mass shipments of new
shoes for inventory from all of the major shoemakers. 56 These vendors
would clearly qualify as "critical vendors," and due to the outstanding
debt owed to these vendors, they were not willing to ship additional inventory without payment on outstanding accounts. 57 Clearly under the
premise of Chapter 11, such payments would be implicitly authorized because all creditors, secured and unsecured, would be better served by a
profitable holiday shopping season. Fortunately, the Delaware court
agreed and found that where the "[tihe Supreme Court, the Third Circuit
and the District of Delaware all recognize the court's power to authorize
payment of pre-petition claims when such payment is necessary for the
debtor's survival during chapter 11," the cases to the contrary represent a
58
minority and misguided opinions.
Being unable to pay "critical vendors"' pre-petition debts when necessary to continue business may spell disaster for future debtors in the
Northern District of Illinois due to Judge Grady's unfortunate holding.
Although there is valid criticism for judges who refuse to enforce the laws
as written, here the purpose of Chapter 11 in conjunction with 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) and the Supreme Court's "doctrine of necessity" clearly support
the continued use of pre-plan authorizations for "critical vendors." Furthermore, before prohibiting pre-plan payments, Judge Grady even admits that the "doctrine of necessity" "is well-intended and may even have
some beneficial results... minimiz[ing] disruptions in doing business and
thus may further reorganization. ' 59 Hopefully, the Seventh Circuit will
reverse Judge Grady on appeal and will articulate carefully for future
courts who must consider the viability of this highly practical solution that
54. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 820-21.
55. 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999).
56. Id. at 823-24.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 825.
59. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. at 823.
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the Supreme Court's "doctrine of necessity" is alive and well, protecting
debtors from being forced into liquidation because of the gridlock imposed on them under the Bankruptcy Code.

480

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

